- SOMMAIRE
.
Tchétchénie, tchetchenie,
declaration, publique, comite, europeen,
prevention, torture, cpt, 13, mars, 2007,
convention, europeenne, prevention, torture,
peines, traitements, inhumains, degradants,
tchetchenie, violation, droits, homme, rapport,
cpt, conseil, europe, accord, russie, detentions,
illegales
Mercredi 14 mars 2007 : TCHETCHENIE
: Le Comité
pour la prévention de la torture (CPT) du Conseil de
l'Europe, mécontent de la persistance de la
torture et de son impunité en Tchétchénie, a
décidé d'utiliser d’user de son pouvoir
discrétionnaire pour publier un rapport sur la
situation des droits de l'homme en Tchétchénie,
sans l'accord de la Russie, en raison de
"l’absence d’amélioration de la
situation", malgré ses recommandations
formulées à la suite de deux visites en
République tchétchène en avril et septembre
2006. "Les réactions des autorités
fédérales (russes) n’ont pas été à la
mesure de la gravité des constatations",
selon le comité qui a joint au rapport une
"déclaration publique", autre
procédure exceptionnelle. La déclaration
publique du CPT s'inscrit dans le cadre de
l'Article 10, paragraphe 2, de la Convention européenne pour la
prévention de la torture et des peines ou
traitements inhumains ou dégradants. L'Article
10, paragraphe 2, stipule que si une Partie à la
Convention "ne coopère pas ou refuse
d'améliorer la situation à la lumière des
recommandations du Comité, celui-ci peut
décider, à la majorité des deux tiers de ses
membres, après que la Partie aura eu la
possibilité de s'expliquer, de faire une
déclaration publique à ce sujet ". Les
autorités russes ont constamment refusé de
s’engager dans un dialogue sérieux sur les
problèmes fondamentaux "ce qui ne peut
être qualifié que de manquement à la
coopération", affirme le CPT dans ce texte.
Le comité se déclare "extrêmement
préoccupé" car "le recours à la
torture et aux autres formes de mauvais
traitements par les membres des forces de
l’ordre et des forces de sécurité persiste
tout comme la pratique des détentions
illégales". Le CPT, qui est mandaté pour
effectuer des visites sans préavis dan les
prisons, commissariats et hôpitaux
psychiatriques des 46 Etats membres du Conseil de
l’Europe, avait déjà eu recours à la
procédure de la "déclaration
publique" en 2001 puis en 2003 en ce qui
concerne la Tchétchénie. Cette dernière
procédure n’avait été utilisée
précédemment que pour la Turquie, en 1991 puis
en 1996.
Déclaration publique relative à la République
tchétchène de la Fédération de Russie
(faite le 13 mars 2007)
Cette déclaration publique est faite en vertu de
l'article 10, paragraphe 2, de la Convention
européenne pour la prévention de la torture et
des peines ou traitements inhumains ou
dégradants.
Strasbourg, 13 mars 2007Samedi 30 septembre 2006
:
COMITE EUROPEEN POUR LA PREVENTION DE LA TORTURE
ET DES PEINES ET TRAITEMENTS INHUMAINS OU
DEGRADANTS (CPT)
Déclaration publique relative à la
République tchétchène de la Fédération de
Russie
(faite le 13 mars 2007)
Depuis février 2000, le CPT a effectué de
nombreuses visites en République tchétchène.
Sur la base de ses rapports de visite, le Comité
a cherché à maintenir un dialogue constructif
avec les autorités russes. A deux reprises
déjà, en juillet 2001 et juillet 2003, le CPT a
estimé devoir recourir à son pouvoir de faire
une déclaration publique* étant donné
l'absence d'amélioration de la situation à la
lumière des recommandations du Comité. Près de
quatre années plus tard, ce point a
malheureusement été à nouveau atteint.
Les visites les plus récentes du CPT en
République tchétchène se sont déroulées en
avril/mai et septembre 2006. A certains égards,
le CPT a noté que de réels progrès avaient
été accomplis - s’agissant notamment des
conditions matérielles de détention. De plus,
la délégation n'a reçu aucune allégation de
mauvais traitement de détenus par le personnel
des établissements pénitentiaires visités.
Cependant, le CPT reste extrêmement préoccupé
par la situation concernant certains domaines
cruciaux couverts par son mandat. Le recours à
la torture et aux autres formes de mauvais
traitements par les membres des forces de l'ordre
et des forces de sécurité persiste, tout comme
la pratique, étroitement liée, des détentions
illégales. En outre, d'après les informations
recueillies, il est évident que les enquêtes
sur les cas faisant état d’allégations de
mauvais traitements ou de détentions illégales
sont encore rarement menées de manière
efficace; cela ne peut que favoriser un climat
d'impunité.
A l'issue de chacune des visites effectuées en
2006, la délégation du CPT a immédiatement
communiqué des observations écrites
détaillées. Les réactions des autorités
fédérales n'ont pas été à la mesure de la
gravité des constatations du Comité, et il en
va de même pour les commentaires récemment
transmis par ces autorités en réponse au
rapport relatif aux deux visites, adopté en
novembre 2006. Bien que faisant preuve d'une
attitude ouverte sur des questions auxiliaires
concernant les conditions de détention, les
autorités russes ont constamment refusé de
s'engager dans un dialogue sérieux avec le CPT
sur les problèmes fondamentaux. Ceci ne peut
être qualifié que de manquement à la
coopération.
La procédure de déclaration publique mise en
œuvre par le CPT en octobre 2006 concernait
notamment les mauvais traitements par le
personnel de l'ORB-2 (Bureau des
opérations/recherches de la Direction Générale
du Ministère des Affaires intérieures de Russie
responsable pour la région fédérale du Sud),
les détentions illégales et l'efficacité des
enquêtes sur des cas faisant état
d’allégations de mauvais traitements. Des
recommandations détaillées ont été faites par
le CPT sur chacune de ces questions; à ce jour,
elles n'ont au mieux reçues que des réponses
symboliques, quand elle n'ont pas été
simplement ignorées. Plutôt que de formuler à
nouveau ces problèmes dans cette déclaration,
le CPT a choisi de rendre public des extraits
pertinents de son rapport de visite ainsi que des
commentaires des autorités russes; le Comité
est d'avis que ces documents parlent
d'eux-mêmes.
Le CPT reste déterminé à poursuivre son
dialogue avec les autorités compétentes, tant
aux niveaux fédéral que local, pour ce qui est
de la République tchétchène, et est prêt à
effectuer d'autres visites dans cette partie de
la Fédération de Russie. Cependant, pour que de
telles visites aient réellement un sens, toutes
les parties concernées doivent être prêtes à
jouer pleinement leur rôle, à la lumière des
valeurs auxquelles la Fédération de Russie a
souscrit.
ANNEXE
[uniquement en anglais]
I. Extracts from the
Report to the Government of the Russian
Federation on the visits to the North Caucasian
region carried out by the European Committee for
the prevention of torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment (CPT) from 25
April to 4 May and 4 to 10 September 2006,
adopted on 10 November 2006
II. FACTS FOUND DURING THE VISITS AND ACTION
PROPOSED
A. Torture and other forms of ill- treatment
1. Chechen Republic
a. preliminary remarks
15. In the course of the visits to the North
Caucasian region in 2006, the CPT’s
delegation once again received many credible
allegations of recent ill-treatment of detained
persons by members of law enforcement agencies
and security forces in the Chechen Republic. The
ill-treatment alleged was frequently of such a
severity that it could be considered to amount to
torture; the methods involved included extensive
beating, asphyxiation using a plastic bag or gas
mask, electric shocks, suspension by the limbs,
hyperextension and, more rarely, the infliction
of burns by cigarettes, lighters or other
devices. Accounts were also received of threats
of execution or of sexual abuse in order to
obtain a confession or information.
The general picture which emerged was that any
detained person who did not promptly confess to
the crime of which he was suspected (or provide
information being sought by those responsible for
the detention) would be in imminent danger of
being ill-treated.
It should be added that much of the
above-mentioned information was not immediately
volunteered, but was only provided once the
delegation had established a degree of confidence
with the persons concerned. Many detained persons
interviewed by the delegation were reluctant to
speak about their experiences whilst in the
custody of law enforcement agencies or other
security forces, and some were visibly
frightened.
16. In a number of cases, medical evidence
consistent with allegations of ill-treatment was
gathered by the CPT’s delegation, through
both direct observation by medical members of the
delegation and the examination of records in SIZO
and IVS facilities. This evidence related in
particular to beatings, burns and, in a few
cases, to electric shocks. For the reasons
already given (see paragraph 8)*, the CPT regrets
that it must refrain from giving further details
concerning specific cases.
17. The information gathered by the delegation
concerns a range of law enforcement agencies
throughout the Chechen Republic. In addition, a
considerable number of persons alleged that they
had been held for some time, and in most cases
ill-treated, in places which did not appear to be
official detention facilities, before being
transferred to a recognised law enforcement
structure or released.
As regards official law enforcement structures, a
particularly high number of allegations of
ill-treatment continue to relate to ORB-2 in
Grozny as well as (more recently) to its
inter-district divisions, especially the division
in Urus-Martan. Other law enforcement structures
where there would appear to be a particularly
high risk of ill-treatment include the Internal
Affairs District Divisions of Groznenskiy
(rural), Leninskiy (Grozny), Gudermes and Naur.
As for places where persons may be unlawfully
detained, a number of consistent allegations were
received in respect of one or more places in the
village of Tsentoroy, and of the “Vega
base” located in the outskirts of Gudermes.
Several allegations were also received of
unlawful detentions in the Shali and Urus-Martan
areas.
18. In stark contrast to the above, the
CPT’s delegation did not receive any
allegations of ill-treatment of prisoners by the
staff of the two SIZOs (Nos. 1 and 2) visited in
the Chechen Republic. On the basis of all the
facts found during the visits in 2006, the
delegation was generally satisfied that these
establishments provided a safe environment in
terms of protection from deliberate ill-treatment
for so long as prisoners are held there.
b. ORB-2
19. The CPT has for years now been drawing the
attention of the Russian authorities to the
serious human rights violations being committed
by staff of the ORB-2 facility in Grozny and
those violations were highlighted in the
Committee's second public statement concerning
the Chechen Republic issued on 10 July 2003. The
Committee was led to believe, in the course of
talks held in January 2005 with Dmitri KOZAK,
Plenipotentiary Representative of the President
of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal
District, that a “thorough” enquiry was
being carried out by the Ministry of the Interior
and the Prosecutor’s Office into the
treatment of detained persons by staff of ORB-2.
However, it subsequently became clear that no
such enquiry had ever been undertaken.
To date, the steps taken in response to the
CPT’s concerns about ORB-2 have consisted
only of: i) the transformation of the detention
facility at the ORB-2 premises into an IVS under
the authority of the Command of the Allied Group
of Forces, and ii) the “processing in due
time and manner” of complaints lodged with
the Prosecutor’s Office. From the
information gathered during the two ad hoc visits
in 2006, it is clear that those measures have not
been sufficient to put a stop to human rights
violations by ORB-2 staff.
20. Formally speaking, the IVS which has been
established on the premises of ORB-2 may be
separate from ORB-2, and the official reporting
line of the IVS staff may differ from that of
ORB-2 staff. However, in reality there is not a
watertight division between the two entities.
The information gathered during the 2006 visits
puts beyond any reasonable doubt that persons
held in the IVS are frequently removed from the
facility at night and handed over to ORB-2 staff,
and that those persons are then at great risk of
ill-treatment. This conclusion is based in part
on individual interviews with numerous persons
with experience of custody in the IVS on the
premises of ORB-2, and on medical evidence
gathered in relation to certain of those persons
and others. It is also based on other information
gathered on site at the IVS, which clearly
suggests that the management of ORB-2 continues
to exercise an important influence over the
day-to-day running of the detention facility.
That this is the case is scarcely surprising
given the very close proximity of the IVS and its
staff to the ORB-2 facility, and the senior level
of the ORB-2 staff concerned as compared to that
of the staff working on site in the IVS. One
member of the IVS staff acknowledged this and
indicated that a request from the Head of ORB-2
for the removal of a detainee at night would be
complied with.
It should be added that the information gathered
by the CPT’s delegation also indicates that
persons detained by ORB-staff may be kept on that
agency’s own premises (and ill-treated) for
some time before they are placed in the IVS for
the first time.
21. At the end of the April/May 2006 visit, the
CPT’s delegation made an immediate
observation under Article 8, paragraph 5, of the
Convention, formally requesting the Russian
authorities to inform the Committee by 2 June
2006 of the measures taken to put an end to
ill-treatment at ORB-2. In their response, the
Russian authorities refer to the findings of the
preliminary inquiries carried out by the
Prosecutor’s Office of the Leninskiy
district of Grozny as regards complaints against
ORB-2 staff.
19 such preliminary inquiries (on complaints from
22 persons) had been carried out in respect of
2005, and 13 (on complaints from 16 persons) in
respect of the first quarter of 2006. The
decision in all of the inquiries had been refusal
to initiate a criminal case. Commenting on the
complaints, the Russian authorities highlighted
the “striking similarities” of the
descriptions, the sometimes “clichéd style
of writing” and the failure to provide any
“objective facts” in support of the
complaints. The overall conclusion reached was
that “persons under investigation have opted
for the method of writing out complaints as a
peculiar means of procedural defence”.
22. In the course of the September 2006 visit,
the CPT’s delegation was able to examine in
detail the files on all the above-mentioned
inquiries. It was found that in fact the
prosecution service had not taken appropriate
action on the complaints and other information
received.
The complaints did display certain similarities
as regards the alleged ill-treatment and the
circumstances in which it was inflicted. However,
such consistency tends to strengthen rather than
weaken their credibility, all the more so given
that in most of the files the same operative
officers were concerned. At the same time, the
complaints displayed individual features and
specific elements that reinforced their
plausibility; they could not be fairly described
as “clichéd”. It should also be noted
that 8 of the 32 inquiries were prompted not by
complaints but instead by reports on admittance
with physical injuries issued by SIZO No. 1; the
authorities' argument that one was dealing with
"a peculiar means of procedural
defence" clearly has no relevance to such
cases.
More significantly, it was discovered that the
major element of most of the inquiries consisted
merely of explanations from the operative
officers involved, combined in some cases with
explanations from the investigator and the
IVS’s feldsher. In 11 of the inquiries, the
alleged victims had not been questioned at all,
and in the other inquiries this crucial element
had clearly consisted of a cursory and
formalistic examination. The inquiries also
displayed other glaring deficiencies, such as the
absence of forensic examinations or undue delays
in seeking such examinations, a failure to take
into account medical documentation from the SIZO,
and the failure to question third parties who
could shed light on the veracity of the complaint
(such as other persons detained at the relevant
time).
To sum up, the minimum requirements of an
effective inquiry had not been met in the great
majority of the 32 inquiries in question.
23. In their response to the delegation’s
statement at the end of the April/May visit, the
Russian authorities also highlight the
“daily” checks of IVS facilities
carried out by prosecutors, in accordance with
Instruction No. 39 of the Prosecutor General of 5
July 2002. Consultation of the relevant register
at the IVS on the premises of ORB-2 indicated
that in practice the facility was visited by a
prosecutor on average three times a week.
According to detained persons interviewed by the
delegation, the check consisted of a rapid tour
of the detention area, during which the
prosecutor would look through the small cell
window and ask the detainee (who would be
standing face turned to the wall) whether
everything was okay.
The delegation had the opportunity to meet the
prosecutor currently tasked with carrying out
these checks. He affirmed that he spoke to the
detainees with the door partially open. However,
he did not agree with the proposal put to him
that it would be better to enter the cell and
speak with the detainees in private; this he felt
would pose a security risk. As regards the
allegations of ill-treatment by ORB-2 staff, he
expressed the opinion that they were most often
just a means for detained persons to protect
themselves.
The CPT considers that the frequent presence of
prosecutors in IVS facilities is in principle a
positive measure and considers that such checks
should take place on a daily basis, as foreseen
by the relevant instruction. However, for such
checks to be truly effective in preventing
ill-treatment, they must involve inter alia much
closer contact with detainees than at present.
This would be true for the monitoring of any law
enforcement establishment but is particularly the
case as regards the IVS currently located on the
premises of ORB-2, where there is a palpable
climate of fear among detained persons.
24. As already indicated, the CPT’s
delegation also received a number of allegations
that persons had been ill-treated while detained
at the inter-district division of ORB-2 in
Urus-Martan. When it finally gained access to the
premises of this facility, the staff present
affirmed that anyone held (“for a maximum of
8 hours”) at the facility for investigative
purposes would be kept in a rather spacious room
equipped with sofas situated on the ground floor.
However, the delegation located a cubicle on the
upper floor of this two storey building which
corresponded exactly to the description which had
been given by the above-mentioned persons of the
place where they said they had been held (for
lengthy periods). In addition, the prosecutor of
Urus-Martan district himself stated that the
inter-district division possessed a cell where
detained persons could be held overnight.
It was impossible to check on the spot who had
been held (and for how long) at the ORB-2
facility in Urus-Martan as, according to staff,
they possessed no register for this purpose. Such
a state of affairs, if true, is clearly
inadmissible. More generally, the rather
aggressive and disdainful manner in which the
ORB-2 staff present behaved towards the
delegation did not augur well for how they would
treat persons in their custody.
25. At the end of the September 2006 visit, the
CPT’s delegation indicated that the
continuing failure to take effective measures to
put an end to ill-treatment at ORB-2 inevitably
raised an issue under Article 10, paragraph 2, of
the Convention. The delegation urged the Russian
authorities to improve the situation as regards
the treatment of detained persons by staff of
ORB-2, both in Grozny and in the inter-district
divisions of the agency. To date, no information
has been provided to the CPT on the measures
taken by the Russian authorities in response to
the delegation’s remarks.
* * *
26. In the light of the remarks in paragraphs 19
to 25, the CPT once again calls upon the Russian
authorities to take immediate action to put a
stop to the ill-treatment of suspected or accused
persons by staff of ORB-2, both in Grozny and in
the inter-district divisions of the agency. That
action should include:
- relocating elsewhere the IVS facility currently
situated on the premises of ORB-2 in Grozny;
- ensuring that any person apprehended by ORB-2
staff is, without delay, placed in an IVS
facility;
- making mandatory the presence of an
investigator attached to the relevant prosecution
service when ORB-2 staff are involved in any
investigative activity requiring direct contact
with a detained person;
- ensuring strict compliance with the right to
have a lawyer present during all questioning or
other investigative activities conducted with the
participation of the suspect or accused;
- delivering to all ORB-2 staff the clear message
that the ill-treatment of detained persons will
be the subject of severe sanctions;
- ensuring that any complaints or other
information indicative of possible
ill-treatment by ORB-2 staff are the subject of
an effective investigation (see also section
II.A.4 below).
c. unlawful detention
27. The CPT has received in the past a large
number of reports about abductions (forced
disappearances) and the related problem of
unlawful detention in the Chechen Republic as
well as other parts of the North Caucasian
region. In the report on its visit in
November/December 2004, the Committee called upon
the Russian authorities to spare no effort in
putting an end to the problem of abductions, and
highlighted in this context the need to ensure
that no illegal detention facilities are operated
in the Chechen Republic. During the 2006 visits,
the CPT's delegation sought, but was not able to
obtain, specific statistics concerning
abductions. However, it is evident from the
information at the CPT's disposal that they
continue to constitute a troubling phenomenon in
the Chechen Republic and in many cases involve an
element of unlawful detention.
28. In the course of the 2006 visits, the
CPT’s delegation again spoke with a number
of persons who gave detailed and credible
accounts of being unlawfully held – on
occasion for prolonged periods – in places
in the Chechen Republic. Frequent reference was
made to facilities located in the village of
Tsentoroy in the Kurchaloy district, run by armed
formations allegedly operating under the command
of Ramzan Kadyrov, the present Prime Minister of
the Chechen Republic. In certain cases, formal
complaints had been lodged with the prosecution
services relating to unlawful detention and
ill-treatment at Tsentoroy.
The CPT’s delegation gained access to
Tsentoroy on 2 May 2006, where it visited a
compound which was under the control of a company
of the 2nd Regiment of the Internal Affairs
Patrol-Sentry Service. The territory of the
compound was surrounded by a high wall and
comprised, inter alia, barracks, a gymnasium, and
a large courtyard. The delegation discovered in
particular two secure rooms half-full of wooden
boxes of ammunition. Each of the rooms had
concrete flooring and a small barred window with
no glass pane.
The layout of the compound and, more
specifically, the location and internal features
of the secure rooms and adjacent ante-room,
corresponded closely to descriptions which the
delegation had received from persons who alleged
that they had been held there (and subjected to
various forms of ill-treatment).
29. At the end of the April/May 2006 visit, the
delegation commented that there could be little
doubt that persons had been detained in the above
facilities in the past and called upon the
Russian authorities to take all necessary steps
to ensure that there was no repetition of such
unlawful detentions. The delegation also
emphasised the need for thorough and expeditious
investigations by the prosecution services into
the complaints of which they had been seised
involving allegations of unlawful detention and
ill-treatment in facilities at Tsentoroy.
The Russian authorities' response of June 2006
was particularly surprising on this issue, it
being claimed that “the prosecutor’s
office had not received any applications or
complaints concerning unlawful detention of
individuals in Ramzan Kadyrov’s private
household or in unregistered places of
deprivation of liberty”. Subsequently, the
matter was clarified at the delegation’s
meeting with the Prosecutor of the Chechen
Republic on 5 September; Mr Kuznetsov was adamant
that there had been no complaints about unlawful
(i.e. unregistered) places of detention at
Tsentoroy, but acknowledged that complaints had
been lodged of unlawful detention in places at
Tsentoroy. The CPT considers that it is not
appropriate to split hairs on matters of such
importance. As for the complaints in question,
the CPT noted that two criminal investigations
which had been suspended in late October 2005 had
been re-opened, on 4 September 2006 (see also
paragraph 49).
30. As already indicated (see paragraph 17),
there have been a number of reports of persons
being unlawfully detained at a military facility
(the “Vega base”) located in the
outskirts of Gudermes (currently used by a
company of the 2nd Regiment of the Internal
Affairs Patrol-Sentry Service) and some formal
complaints have been lodged about such
detentions.
The CPT’s delegation went to this base
during the September 2006 visit, and discovered a
closed facility clearly resembling a detention
area. As one entered through the main gate, the
facility was located to the right of the
principal courtyard, close to a kitchen and
premises used for food storage. A metal door with
a small grilled window gave access to a short
corridor leading to two small and windowless
cell-type rooms. The facility was apparently
being used at present for storage purposes.
However, the walls of the rooms bore numerous
inscriptions (names; dates, the most recent being
02.03.2006; improvised calendars and references
to periods of time, e.g. 22 days, 31 days, 41
days; messages) which were highly suggestive of a
context of detention. It should also be noted
that the facility matched precisely the
description given to the delegation by a person
who claimed that he had been held in a detention
facility at the “Vega base” some time
ago.
31. Reference should also be made to the
delegation’s visit on 2 May 2006 to the
Headquarters of the Vostok Battalion of the 42nd
Division of the Ministry of Defence, which are
situated close to Gudermes. The delegation had
received reports that persons had in the past
been held unlawfully at these Headquarters, in
particular in cells located under the
“canteen”.
In one section of the basement of the building
housing the Headquarters’ restaurant, the
delegation discovered 8 rooms with metal
padlocked doors. A sheet of paper had been
attached to the door of each room on which was
written “storage”; however, the rooms
were empty. Another section of the basement
(accessed by a separate staircase) contained
similar rooms, and several of them were indeed
being used for storage purposes.
The above-mentioned rooms were certainly
sufficiently secure to be used for detention
purposes, and the presence of a series of short
vertical marks on a wall of one of the rooms can
only reinforce doubts as to the use to which
these facilities have been put in the past.
32. Evidence produced in the course of a recent
case before the Supreme Court of the Chechen
Republic[1] illustrates the practice of unlawful
detention and associated ill-treatment. It
appears from the Court’s judgment that at
the outset of the hearing, the accused stated
that their confessions had been extracted under
torture including severe beatings. During the
court’s consideration of the case, a video
tape was shown of the accused being held and
ill-treated "in the basement of a building
in the Novogrozny settlement of Gudermes housing
a special police regiment named after Akhmat
Kadyrov". The judge acknowledged that the
accused had confessed to certain of the crimes in
question as a result of “acts of physical
and mental pressure” in the above-mentioned
basement. Moreover, the fact that the accused
were held in the basement prior to the time at
which, according to the detention records, they
were taken into custody was also taken into
account by the judge when fixing the accused
person’s terms of imprisonment for another
crime.
33. In its statement at the end of the September
2006 visit, the CPT’s delegation emphasised
once again the importance of taking the necessary
steps, including effective investigations, to
prevent places in Tsentoroy being used again as
places of unlawful detention. It should be noted
in this connection that the delegation received
during that visit credible allegations that
persons had been unlawfully held at the
previously-mentioned compound in Tsentoroy as
recently as August 2006. The delegation also
requested that the relevant prosecution service
carry out a prompt and detailed inspection of the
closed facility it had found in the “Vega
base” situated in the outskirts of Gudermes.
To date, no information has been provided to the
CPT on the action taken by the Russian
authorities in response to the delegation’s
remarks.
* * *
34. In the light of the remarks in paragraphs 27
to 33, the CPT calls upon the Russian authorities
to ensure that effective investigations are
carried out into all complaints and other
information indicative of the unlawful detention
of persons:
- in facilities located in the village of
Tsentoroy;
- in the military facility (the “Vega
base”) located in the outskirts of Gudermes
(see paragraph 30);
- at the Headquarters of the Vostok Battalion of
the 42nd Division of the Ministry of Defence;
- in any other facility located elsewhere in the
Chechen Republic.
(see also Section II.A.4. below).
The CPT requests the Russian authorities to
provide a full account of the proceedings to date
in each of the investigations concerned, and to
inform the Committee of the findings made and
conclusions drawn following the inspection by the
relevant prosecution service of the closed
facility found by its delegation at the
previously-mentioned “Vega base”.
4. Investigations into cases involving
allegations of ill-treatment
47. One of the objectives of the September 2006
visit to the Chechen Republic was to obtain
detailed information on investigations into cases
involving allegations of ill-treatment. As the
Committee has emphasised in the past, assessing
the effectiveness of action taken by the
competent investigatory authorities when
ill-treatment may have occurred constitutes an
integral part of the Committee's preventive
mandate, given the implications that such action
has for future conduct by public officials. More
generally, it is now a well-established principle
that effective investigations, capable of leading
to the identification and punishment of those
responsible for ill-treatment, are essential to
give practical meaning to the prohibition of
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.
The criteria which an investigation into
allegations of ill-treatment must meet in order
to be qualified as "effective" have
been established through the case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights.[2] In particular,
the investigation should be thorough and
comprehensive, it should be conducted in a prompt
and expeditious manner, and the persons
responsible for carrying out the investigation
should be independent from those implicated in
the events.
48. The CPT has already referred to its
assessment of the 32 preliminary inquiries
carried out in respect of 2005 and the first
quarter of 2006 by the prosecutor’s office
of the Leninskiy district of Grozny, as regards
complaints and other information received
concerning possible ill-treatment by ORB-2 staff
(see paragraph 22). Those inquiries failed to
meet the requirements of an effective
investigation and, in particular, the criteria of
thoroughness and promptness/expeditiousness.
The preliminary inquiry concerning “A”,
instigated following a report on admittance with
physical injuries issued by SIZO No. 1, can be
given as an example. This prisoner was found to
bear multiple haematomas (to the shoulders, back,
legs, eye region) when admitted to the SIZO on 26
December 2005 and alleged having been beaten at
ORB-2, on the premises of which he had spent 11
days. The extent of the inquiry was limited to
receiving written explanations from staff of
ORB-2 and staff of the IVS located on its
premises. The decision to refuse to initiate a
criminal case was taken without ever questioning
the prisoner concerned, other detainees held at
the IVS at the relevant time or officials
responsible for his transfer from the IVS to the
SIZO. No attempt was made to explain the
contradiction between the records of the IVS
(absence of injuries on departure) and the
medical findings on admission at the SIZO. The
CPT considers that the preliminary inquiry
concerning “A” should be re-opened and
the relevant investigative steps taken, in the
light of the above remarks.
Reference might also be made to a more recent
preliminary inquiry, instigated on 2 June 2006 in
respect of “B”. This prisoner was
transferred to SIZO No. 1 on 23 May 2006 and the
medical examination upon arrival revealed
multiple bodily injuries which he alleged were
the result of beatings by ORB-2 officers. A
decision of refusal to initiate a criminal case
was taken on the basis of the medical register of
the IVS and the feldsher’s explanations to
the effect that “B” had, on his arrival
at the IVS on 13 May 2006, displayed injuries
received at the time of apprehension; no forensic
examination was ever requested. However, the CPT
noted that by decision of 7 September 2006, the
decision of refusal to initiate a criminal case
was revoked on the grounds that the inquiry had
been incomplete.
Another illustrative case is that of
“C” who filed successive complaints in
2006 about ill-treatment, inter alia whilst in
the custody of ORB-2. It is particularly
noteworthy that following his admission to SIZO
No. 1, he was subsequently returned to the IVS at
ORB-2 in May 2006. On return to the SIZO on 1
June, he was found to bear numerous violet
haematomas in the region of the right shoulder
and right thigh. Despite these injuries and
related complaints, relevant procedural steps
were not taken and a decision on refusal to
initiate a criminal case was adopted. That said,
by the time of the September 2006 visit that
decision had been revoked and the inquiry
resumed.
49. In addition to files on preliminary
inquiries, the delegation was able to examine in
detail the files on criminal cases initiated
concerning the alleged unlawful detention and
ill-treatment of “D” and “E”.
These persons alleged that they had been detained
successively at Tsentoroy and the Internal
Affairs Division of Gudermes in November-December
2004 and severely ill treated in both of those
places (“E” also alleging that he was
detained at the Vega base in Gudermes). Once
again, it was found that the criteria of an
effective investigation had not been met.
In the first place, despite the fact that both
persons alleged ill-treatment by the militia in
Gudermes, the investigation was entrusted to an
investigator of the Gudermes Internal Affairs
Division. Consequently, the investigation lacked
the necessary element of independence. As regards
the case concerning ”D”, the only
investigative activity carried out prior to the
suspension of the investigation on 25 October
2005 was the questioning of a single operative
officer. In contrast, “E” was
questioned and he gave testimony identifying
several elements of considerable relevance for
the investigation (including clear descriptions
of the places where he claimed to have been
unlawfully held). However, the necessary
procedural steps to explore those elements (such
as an on-site visit) were never taken and the
investigation on the case was suspended.
The CPT nevertheless notes that the
above-mentioned criminal investigations were
re-opened by decisions dated 4 September 2006 and
taken over by the Prosecutor’s Office of the
Chechen Republic.
50. Reference should also be made to the criminal
case initiated in respect of the alleged unlawful
detention of the brothers “F” in
January 2006. The brothers were questioned but no
other substantial investigative activities were
apparently undertaken. In particular, despite
detailed descriptions and drawings provided by
the alleged victims, no measures had been taken
to locate the facility (close to the village of
Bachi-Yurt) where they claimed to have been held.
The criminal investigation had been formally
suspended twice, but was re-opened by decision of
5 September 2006.
51. A disturbing feature of several of the cases
examined by the delegation was the subsequent
return of persons alleging ill-treatment to
militia establishments for questioning on their
complaints and/or further investigative
activities, and even to the very law enforcement
agency where they alleged that the ill-treatment
had occurred (cf. for example, the cases of
“G”, the brothers “H” and
“I”). The brothers “H” were
returned to ORB-2 in Urus-Martan, despite their
express and recorded request not to be sent there
again as they were afraid of being tortured. Such
a state of affairs is totally inadmissible.
The brothers “H” alleged very serious
ill-treatment whilst in the custody of ORB-2 in
Urus-Martan, both when initially detained there
in November 2005 and when returned there on
different occasions for investigative activities.
The preliminary inquiry into the complaints
lodged by the brothers was opened, closed and
re-opened a number of times, the brothers
repeatedly making, then withdrawing, then making
again their complaints of ill-treatment. The
Committee considers that in order to reach a
sound conclusion as to the manner in which they
were treated whilst in the custody of the
Urus-Martan inter-district division of ORB-2, it
is necessary to re-open the preliminary inquiry.
The first investigative activity taken in the
re-opened inquiry should be to interview
individually each of the brothers in a safe
environment (e.g. Correctional Colony No. 2 in
Chernokozovo where they are currently held);
those interviews should be conducted by a
prosecutor/investigator who has not previously
been involved in the criminal cases brought
against them and they should be entitled to be
assisted at those interviews by a lawyer of their
choice.
52. As already indicated, the requirement of
promptness is essential for an effective
investigation. Failing this, crucial evidence, in
particular of a medical character, may well be
lost. More specifically, conducting a forensic
medical examination weeks after the alleged
ill-treatment will in many cases be of little
assistance for the purposes of establishing the
truth and may even prove detrimental to that
objective.
Judges called upon to decide within 48 hours of
apprehension on the application of the preventive
measure of remand in custody are well-placed to
ensure that any indications of ill-treatment are
recorded and investigated at an early stage (i.e.
before any traces disappear). However,
information gathered during the visits in 2006
would suggest that effective action is still not
being taken by judicial authorities at this
stage. The delegation also noted that it could
take weeks (more specifically, from 10 to 26
days) for reports drawn up by SIZO No. 1 in
Grozny on physical injuries recorded at admission
to reach the relevant prosecutor’s office.
Other, more rapid, means of delivery than the
postal service need to be found. For the same
reason, persons who allege ill-treatment in
custody, or their lawyers or doctors, should be
able to have a medical examination by a doctor
from an official forensic establishment carried
out without delay. However, it remains the case
that the carrying out of such forensic
examinations is impossible without authorisation
from an investigating or judicial authority. The
inevitable outcome is that persons alleging
ill-treatment will frequently be prevented from
providing “any objective facts to support
their conclusions”[3].
53. In the light of the above, the CPT
recommends:
- that immediate steps be taken to ensure that
all investigations into cases involving
allegations of ill-treatment meet fully the
criteria of an “effective”
investigation as established by the European
Court of Human Rights;
- that, when persons lodge complaints about the
manner in which they were treated whilst in the
custody of a law enforcement agency, all
subsequent investigative activities concerning
those complaints be carried out in a safe
environment, away from the law enforcement agency
at which the ill-treatment was allegedly
inflicted. Further, for so long as a preliminary
inquiry or criminal investigation into possible
ill-treatment is underway, the persons concerned
should under no circumstances, for any
investigative purpose, be returned to the custody
of the law enforcement agency where it is alleged
the ill-treatment was inflicted;
- that judges considering a request on the
application of the preventive measure of remand
in custody immediately order a forensic medical
examination and bring the matter to the attention
of the relevant prosecution service whenever
there are grounds to believe that the person
brought before them could have been the victim of
ill-treatment;
- that a mode of delivery be established which
ensures timely submission to the prosecuting
authorities of reports drawn up by SIZO
establishments on physical injuries recorded at
admission;
- that persons who allege ill-treatment in
custody, or their lawyers or doctors, be able to
have a medical examination by a doctor from an
official forensic establishment carried out
without prior authorisation from an investigating
or judicial authority.
Further, the CPT would like to receive in due
course full information on the outcome of the
preliminary inquiries and criminal investigations
concerning the allegations made by “B”
(see paragraph 48), “C” (see paragraph
48), “D” (see paragraph 49),
“E” (see paragraph 49), and the
brothers “F” (see paragraph 50).
54. In the course of the September 2006 visit,
the CPT’s delegation also noted the case of
a prisoner, “J”, who was admitted to
SIZO No. 1 in Grozny on 14 August 2006 after a
period of custody in Groznenskiy (rural) District
Internal Affairs Division. According to the entry
in the medical register, he displayed massive
bruising on numerous parts of his body as well as
other injuries. The Committee understands that a
complaint has been lodged on behalf of this
prisoner, alleging severe ill-treatment while in
the custody of the above-mentioned internal
affairs division. The CPT wishes to receive in
due course full information on the outcome of the
preliminary inquiry into that complaint.
55. Of course, in order to ensure the
effectiveness of investigations into allegations
of ill-treatment, it is also essential that
forensic medical services are able to provide the
support required by the criminal justice system.
In this connection, the CPT’s delegation
went to the Republican Forensic Medical Bureau in
Grozny during the April/May 2006 visit.
Significant investments have been made in
equipment and the physical facility of the
forensic bureau in Grozny, and the structure is
now no doubt one of the best within the North
Caucasian region. However, despite these
investments, no progress had been made in
establishing certain essential functions, such as
an autopsy service. The delegation highlighted
the need for effective management leadership at
the facility and called for a more active
involvement of the Federal Centre of Forensic
Medicine in resolving the present situation.
During the final talks at the end of the visit,
representatives of the Ministry of Health
undertook to take measures to increase support to
the Republican Forensic Medical Bureau in Grozny.
The CPT would like to receive full information on
the measures taken and their results.
Translation
II. Extracts from the
Federal State authorities’ comments on the
report by the European Committee
for the prevention of torture (CPT) to the
Government of the Russian Federation
on the visits to the North Caucasian region of
the Russian Federation
from 25 April to 4 May and from 4 to 10 September
2006
transmitted on 19 February 2006
……………..
Response from the Russian Federation (RF)
Prosecutor General’s Office to paragraphs
…, 18 and 19 of the CPT report :
In accordance with section 5.1 of the RF
Prosecutor General’s Order No. 39 of 5 July
2002 “On organisation of prosecutorial
oversight of the legality of criminal prosecution
at the pre-trial stage of proceedings”, the
Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic
(ChR) makes daily checks to ensure that the law
is complied with when placing and holding
suspects and accused persons in the temporary
holding facility (IVS) of the Temporary Task
Force of internal affairs agencies and units
(VOGOiP) responsible for conducting the
counterterrorist operation in the North Caucasus
region, and which is housed in the building of
Operational/Search Bureau No. 2 (ORB-2).
At a meeting between the CPT delegation and the
President of the Chechen Republic, the head of
the delegation, Mr Palma, expressed concern at
reports about people being held unlawfully in a
number of institutions designed for housing
suspects and persons accused of committing
crimes, as well as convicted prisoners, and
located in the Chechen Republic. Specifically,
this refers to the 2nd company of the 2nd
regiment named after Akhmad Kadyrov, which is
stationed in the village of Tsentoroy. According
to Mr Palma, some of the premises occupied by
this unit match the description given by
individuals claiming to have been unlawfully
detained there and tortured.
In the course of the investigations carried out
by the ChR Prosecutor’s Office, however, no
evidence was found to support these reports.
The ChR Prosecutor’s Office has no
information at present about any violations to do
with holding people in facilities which are not
designated for that purpose.
………………..
Response from the RF Prosecutor General’s
Office to paragraphs 15-17, 21-23 and 48-49 of
the CPT report :
Any complaints received from suspects and accused
persons held in the IVS run by the VOGOiP of the
RF Ministry of Internal Affairs concerning the
use of violence are investigated under Articles
144 and 145 of the RF Code of Criminal Procedure.
Over the period 2000-2006, the ChR
Prosecutor’s Office received 245 statements
and reports concerning the use of violence
against suspects and accused persons. Following
investigation, criminal cases were instigated in
the following 12 cases:
Case No. 45575, opened on 11 May 2005 under
Article 112, paragraph 2, sub-paragraphs c and d,
of the RF Criminal Code, for causing bodily
injuries to “D” while he was in
custody;
Case No. 45576, opened on 11 May 2005 under
Article 112, paragraph 2, sub-paragraphs c and d,
of the RF Criminal Code, for causing bodily
injuries to “E” while he was in
custody;
Case No. 46110, opened on 17 September 2005 under
Article 127, paragraph 2, sub-paragraphs a, c, d
and g, of the RF Criminal Code, for unlawful
deprivation of liberty of “K-1”,
“K-2”, “K-3”,
“K-4”, “K-5”, “K-6”
and “K-7”, residents of the village of
Novyye Atagi in the Shalinskiy district of the
Chechen Republic, by members of the Second
Regiment of the Patrol-Sentry Militia Service
(PPSM) of the ChR Ministry of Internal Affairs
from 10 to 13 September 2005 (in this criminal
case, a deputy commander of the 1st company of
PPSM-2, was charged with committing an offence
under Article 286, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph a,
of the RF Criminal Code);
Case No. 43110, opened on 8 October 2005 under
Article 111, paragraph 1, of the RF Criminal
Code, on the grounds that militiamen from the
Staropromyslovskiy District Department of
Internal Affairs (ROVD) in Grozny caused serious
damage to the health of “L” while he
was in custody;
Case No. 50057, opened on 24 April 2006 under
Article 286, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph a, of the
RF Criminal Code, for causing bodily injuries to
“M” during the preliminary
investigation;
Case No. 50032, opened on 15 March 2006 under
Article 286, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph a, of the
RF Criminal Code, against officers of ORB-2 of
the Chief Directorate of the RF Ministry of
Internal Affairs responsible for the Southern
Federal Region for the use of violence against
“N”;
Case No. 50112, opened on 30 June 2006 under
Article 105 and Article 286, paragraph 3,
sub-paragraph a, of the RF Criminal Code,
following the discovery of the corpse of
“O”, bearing injuries, at the IVS of
the VOGOiP of the RF Ministry of Internal
Affairs;
Case No. 57060, opened on 4 October 2006, under
Article 286, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph a, of the
RF Criminal Code on the grounds that staff of
ORB-2 of the Chief Directorate of the RF Ministry
of Internal Affairs responsible for the Southern
Federal Region used physical violence against
“P” in order to extract testimony from
him (these cases are being dealt with by the
criminal investigation department of the ChR
Prosecutor’s Office);
Case No. 50179, opened on 6 October 2006 under
Article 286, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph a, of the
RF Criminal Code, on the grounds that a number of
unidentified ORB-2 officers caused bodily
injuries to “Q” in March 2005;
Case No. 50071, opened on 19 May 2006 under
Article 286, paragraph 1, of the RF Criminal
Code, on the grounds that a number of
unidentified ORB-2 officers caused bodily
injuries to the arrestee, “R”;
Case No. 54076, opened under Article 286,
paragraph 3, sub-paragraph a, of the RF Criminal
Code on the grounds that officials of Groznenskiy
ROVD detained unlawfully and used physical
violence against “S”;
Case No. 50191, opened under Article 286,
paragraph 3, sub-paragraph a, of the RF Criminal
Code in connection with the causing of bodily
injuries to “T” at the IVS of the
VOGOiP of the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs.
In the case of the remaining 233 statements and
reports concerning the use of violence against
suspects and accused persons, it was decided,
after investigation, not to prosecute.
In order to safeguard the rights of suspects and
accused persons in criminal cases, including
persons being investigated by the Russian Federal
Security Service (FSB), the provisions of Article
92, paragraph 3, of the RF Code of Criminal
Procedure are observed, under which the
supervising prosecutor must be notified in
writing within 12 hours of persons being detained
on suspicion of committing crimes.
Response from the RF Ministry of Justice to
paragraphs 18 and … of the CPT report :
In order to prevent violations of the rights and
lawful interests of suspects and persons accused
of committing crimes, and also of convicted
prisoners, a human rights structure was set up in
the penitentiary system on 25 October 2001. It
consists of the department responsible for the
observance of human rights in the penitentiary
system at the Federal Penal Enforcement Service
(FSIN), and assistant heads of the territorial
agencies of FSIN responsible for the observance
of human rights in the penitentiary system. These
structural subdivisions of the FSIN monitor
pre-trial establishments (SIZOs) and correctional
institutions to ensure that human rights are
respected.
Response from the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs
to paragraphs 20 and 21 of the CPT report :
Structurally speaking, the IVS of the Temporary
Task Force of agencies and units of the RF
Ministry of Internal Affairs (VOGOiP) is
independent from Operational/Search Bureau No. 2
for combating organised crime, of the Chief
Directorate of the RF Ministry of Internal
Affairs responsible for the Southern Federal
Region (ORB-2). Given that it is located at the
same site as ORB-2, however, the activities of
the IVS of the VOGOiP are wholly geared to
achieving the aims and purposes of ORB-2. The
staff employed at the IVS (35 people), including
civilians, are made up of officials seconded from
the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Chief
Directorate of Internal Affairs and the
Directorates of Internal Affairs of the
constituent entities of the Russian Federation,
on a contractual basis.
Citizens are detained by ORB-2 officers in
keeping with the requirements of Article 92 of
the RF Code of Criminal Procedure. The detainees
are sent to the IVS of the VOGOiP, where they are
entered in the custody records and undergo a
compulsory medical examination.
Using the office space at ORB-2 to house
detainees once the investigative measures have
been completed is inadvisable, as they are more
likely in that case to escape or commit other
unlawful acts.
Removing persons against whom it has been decided
to apply the prevention measure of remand in
custody from the cells of the IVS of the VOGOiP
at night is against the Internal Regulations of
temporary holding facilities for suspects and
accused persons. Senior officials at both the IVS
of the VOGOiP and ORB-2 must take firm action to
prevent this from happening.
In order to uncover any places where persons
might be held unlawfully, a commission consisting
of officials from the Chief Directorate of the RF
Ministry of Internal Affairs responsible for the
Southern Federal Region and the ChR Ministry of
Internal Affairs inspected sites occupied by the
inter-district divisions of ORB-2 in Urus-Martan,
Shali, Naurskaya and Gudermes.
In the course of the inspections, the commission
found no information that people were being held
unlawfully on the premises of the divisions of
ORB-2. Nor did it find any places where detainees
might be held.
Officials from the ChR Ministry of Internal
Affairs inspected temporary sites occupied by
troops of the PPSM No. 2 regiment in Oyskhara in
the Gudermes district, in Tsotsin-Yurt in the
Kurchaloy district, and in Avtury, Shali,
Nozhai-Yurt and Achkhoy-Martan.
In the course of the inspections, it was
established that there were no rooms for
administrative detainees or facilities for
temporarily housing detainees at the headquarters
of the “Akhmad Kadyrov” PPSM regiment
or at sites occupied by the troops on a temporary
basis. In accordance with orders issued by the RF
Ministry of Internal Affairs and the ChR Ministry
of Internal Affairs concerning the activities of
PPSM units, there are no facilities of the kind
referred to above.
The premises referred to in the CPT’s report
were intended for domestic purposes and were not
used for housing people.
In accordance with the CPT’s wishes, as part
of the professional training programme,
additional courses have been provided for staff
from the IVS of the VOGOiP and ORB-2 to acquaint
them with the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, the European Convention for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Federal Law No. 103-FZ
of 15 July 1995 “On the custody of suspects
and accused persons” and orders issued by
the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Response from the RF Ministry of Justice to
paragraphs 22 and … of the CPT report :
In an effort to prevent, detect and put a stop to
any unlawful actions in institutions and/or
agencies within the Penal Enforcement System
(UIS), investigations are carried out into any
reports, including those received from human
rights organisations and the media, concerning
incidents and possible criminal offences in
places of detention.
Investigations are likewise carried out into any
reports received from medical staff who discover
bodily injuries on suspects, accused persons or
convicted prisoners, including when they arrive
at SIZOs from the internal affairs agencies.
Under Article 140 of the RF Code of Criminal
Procedure, where there are sufficient indications
that a crime has been committed, the file is sent
to the Prosecutor’s Office. This procedure
was introduced by Order No. 170 issued by the
Chief Directorate of Penal Enforcement of the RF
Ministry of Justice on 27 July 2002
“Approving the Instruction on the procedure
for receiving, registering, recording and dealing
with, in penal institutions of the RF Ministry of
Justice, any statements, confessions or reports
about committed or planned crimes or other
incidents”.
Response from the RF Prosecutor General’s
Office to paragraphs 30-39 and … of the CPT
report :
According to the ChR Prosecutor’s Office,
the town of Gudermes used to be home to the
“Vega base” of the Security Service of
the President of the Chechen Republic. In
2004-2005, the unit stationed at the base was
disbanded. The Prosecutor General’s Office
has no further information on this subject.
……………………
Response from the RF Ministry of Defence to
paragraph 31 of the CPT report :
No evidence has been found to support the
allegations of unlawful detention of the persons
referred to in paragraph 31.
…………………..
Response from the RF Ministry of Justice to
paragraph 47 of the CPT report :
The handling of complaints and applications
received from citizens in the Russian Federation
is governed by Federal Law No. 59-FZ of 2 May
2005 “On the procedure for examining
applications from citizens of the Russian
Federation”.
In the penitentiary system, such activities are
governed by Order No. 383 issued by the Russian
Ministry of Justice on 26 December 2006
“Approving the Administrative Regulations on
the exercise of state functions in organising the
examination of proposals, statements and
complaints from convicted prisoners and persons
remanded in custody”.
The procedure for gathering information and
conducting investigations into failures to comply
with the law in the penal enforcement system is
governed by Order No. 250 issued by the Russian
Ministry of Justice on 11 July 2006
“Approving the Instruction on the procedure
for receiving, registering and investigating in
UIS institutions and agencies reports concerning
crimes and/or other incidents”.
Response from the RF Prosecutor General’s
Office to paragraph 50 of the CPT report :
Most of the recommendations made in §50 of the
CPT report are enshrined in law at both federal
and ministerial level. In particular, under
sections 5 and 6 of Order No. 39 issued by the RF
Prosecutor General’s Office on 5 July 2002
“On organisation of prosecutorial oversight
of the legality of criminal prosecution at the
pre-trial stage of proceedings”, staff of
the prosecutor’s office are bound to make
daily checks on the lawfulness of detention of
suspects and accused persons in temporary holding
facilities and military detention facilities
(“gauptvachta”), and to react sharply
to any infringements of the detention procedure
or any inconsistencies in the detention
protocols, etc.
In order to ensure a prompt and efficient
investigation into the circumstances surrounding
the detention of suspects in criminal cases, when
deciding which preventive measure to apply,
prosecutors conduct interviews with the suspects,
in which they inquire about any unauthorised
methods of investigation and the use of violence
at the time of apprehension.
The ChR Prosecutor’s Office has examined the
records of the investigations into complaints
filed by persons facing criminal prosecution.
It has found that the complaints are similar in
substance, usually involving a description of the
circumstances in which physical and psychological
pressure was brought to bear by operative staff,
including ORB-2 officers, on suspects and accused
persons in an attempt to obtain confessions.
There are similarities not only in the
complainants’ descriptions of the
circumstances (where and how) in which pressure
was applied, but also in the style in which the
complaints are written. Often in the course of
the investigations, complainants refused to
elaborate on their complaints or statements, or
said that they would not be able to identify the
officers who abused them and did not know their
names. In each instance, it was claimed that the
treatment complained of resulted in them
confessing to the offences of which they stood
accused.
Numerous checks of such allegations suggest that
the complaints filed by suspects and/or accused
persons are simply an attempt to avoid
prosecution.
There have also been instances of self-harm in a
bid to incriminate law enforcement officials.
For example, the ChR Prosecutor’s Office
received a complaint from an accused man,
“G”, alleging that he had been
physically abused, taunted and tortured by
officers from ORB-2 of the Chief Directorate of
the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs for the
Southern Federal Region, in order to get him to
confess to a number of robberies.
In the course of the investigation, it was found
that in an attempt to get earlier testimony
provided by him declared inadmissible,
“G” had inflicted cigarette burns on
his arms and shoulders and, with the help of a
cellmate, on his back, saying that he would show
the burns to a doctor and claim he had been
tortured.
All of the circumstances referred to above
indicate that accused persons file complaints in
an attempt to cast doubt on the legality of
investigative activities conducted with their
participation.
The ChR Prosecutor’s Office has received no
reports of any infringements of Article 18 of
Federal Law No. 103-FZ of 15 July 1995 “On
the custody of suspects and accused
persons”.
Nor has it received any complaints about lawyers
being denied access to the IVS of the VOGOiP of
the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs.
While investigating temporary holding facilities,
prosecutors discovered violations of Federal Law
No. 103-FZ of 15 July 1995 “On the custody
of suspects and accused persons” as well as
of Order No. 950 issued by the RF Ministry of
Internal Affairs on 22 November 2005 “On
approving the internal regulations of Internal
Affairs’ temporary holding facilities for
suspects and accused persons” and Order No.
1 P 5/475 jointly issued by the RF Ministry of
Internal Affairs and the RF Ministry of Health
and Social Development on 31 December 1999
“On approving the Instruction on the
procedure governing medical and sanitary
provision for persons held in Internal
Affairs’ temporary holding facilities”.
In response to the detected infringements of the
laws and ministerial orders governing the
detention of suspects and accused persons in
temporary holding facilities, relating to
everyday living conditions, diet, clothing,
medical assistance and sanitation, in 2006 the
Chechen Prosecutor’s Office made submissions
to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the
Chechen Republic and the head of the VOGOiP of
the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs, demanding
that they eliminate the causes and conditions
contributing to violations of the law and orders
issued by the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs.
As a result of these submissions, a number of
failings have now been remedied: the internal
regulations of temporary holding facilities
(IVSs) have been approved; logbooks have been
introduced for recording suggestions, statements
and complaints filed by suspects and accused
persons and addressed to the prosecutor, courts
and/or state authorities entitled to monitor
IVSs; appointments books have been introduced for
suspects and accused persons wishing to speak
privately with the head of the IVS; outdoor
exercise schedules have been drawn up for
suspects and accused persons held in IVS
facilities, and steps are being taken to resolve
matters concerning everyday amenities.
The management of the ChR Ministry of Internal
Affairs is taking measures to bring conditions of
detention in temporary holding facilities into
line with current Russian legislation, as
evidenced by the fact that the repair and
reconstruction of IVS facilities have been
included in the regional programme
“Restoring the economy and social sphere in
the Chechen Republic over the period
2007-2010”.
Repairs have been carried out at a number of
IVSs. The temporary holding facility run by
Gudermes ROVD has been fully repaired, and other
measures are being taken to ensure that the
rights of suspects and accused persons are
observed during the time that they are in IVS
facilities.
The last time it was in the region, the CPT
delegation visited SIZOs Nos. 1 and 2 and a
number of temporary holding facilities, in
particular the IVSs in the Leninskiy and
Zavodskiy districts of Grozny, and the IVS
facilities run by Argun GOVD and Gudermes ROVD.
Following its visit, the CPT noted that in a
number of IVSs, repairs had been carried out,
that conditions of detention had significantly
improved and that according to the logbooks, the
rules governing the length of time for which
people may be held in IVSs were not being
infringed. Conditions of detention in SIZOs are
basic, but perfectly acceptable. The rights of
people remanded in custody are duly observed and
there is no rough treatment on the part of the
administration. There has also been a substantial
improvement in the system of medical screening of
persons arriving at the facilities with bodily
injuries.
It was further observed that the supervision
exercised by the Prosecutor’s Office over
IVSs has become more effective.
Response from the RF Ministry of Justice to
paragraph 52 of the CPT report :
Under sections 130 and 132 of the “Internal
Regulations of SIZOs in the Penal Enforcement
System”, as approved by Order No. 189 issued
by the RF Ministry of Justice on 14 October 2005,
where there has been a deterioration in the state
of health of suspects or accused persons, or
where they have sustained bodily injuries, they
must undergo immediate medical screening by the
medical staff of the SIZOs concerned. This
screening includes a medical examination and, if
necessary, further investigations and
consultations with specialist physicians. The
findings are entered in the clinical records and
communicated to the suspect or accused person in
a way that is intelligible to them.
At the request of the suspect or accused person,
or of their defence lawyer, a copy of the
conclusions of the medical examination report is
issued to them.
By decision of the head of the SIZO or of the
person or body dealing with the criminal case, or
on application by the suspect or accused or their
defence lawyer, the medical screening is carried
out by staff from other medical institutions. In
the event of refusal to conduct such screening,
an appeal may be lodged with the prosecutor or
the courts.
Response from the RF Prosecutor General’s
Office to paragraph 53 of the CPT report :
On 11 January 2006, a number of unidentified
persons in camouflage unlawfully entered
apartment … in Grozny, where they abducted
two brothers, “F”, driving them off in
an unknown direction. The brothers were later
released, whereupon they returned home. On 14
January 2006, Zavodskiy District
Prosecutor’s Office in Grozny responded to
the incident by instituting criminal proceedings
under Article 126, paragraph 2, sub-paragraphs a,
d and g, of the RF Criminal Code.
In the course of the investigation, it was
established that the brothers had not been held
at any facilities designated for holding persons
detained on suspicion of committing crimes as a
preventive measure or at facilities for persons
detained or arrested under the administrative
procedure. The preliminary investigation into the
criminal case was suspended on 13 November 2006
under Article 208, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 1,
of the RF Code of Criminal Procedure (failure to
identify the person to be prosecuted).
On 11 May 2006, the ChR Prosecutor’s Office
received a complaint from the establishment
IZ-20/1 of the Department of FSIN in the Chechen
Republic. The complaint had been filed by the
accused in criminal case No. 11133,
“C”, who alleged that during the
preliminary investigation he had been subjected
to physical abuse by ORB-2 officers.
On the strength of the allegations, the ChR
Prosecutor’s Office carried out an
investigation, as a result of which it was
decided on 25 May 2006 not to instigate criminal
proceedings.
Following receipt of a second complaint from
“C” about the use of unauthorised
methods of inquiry by ORB-2 officers, the
decision of 25 May 2006 not to instigate criminal
proceedings was revoked by the deputy prosecutor
of the Chechen Republic on 10 October 2006 and
the case-file returned so that a further
investigation could be conducted.
In the course of the second investigation, no
objective evidence was found to support
“C’s” allegations of abuse by
members of the militia and as a result, it was
once again decided, on 20 October 2006, not to
instigate criminal proceedings. This decision was
deemed by the ChR Prosecutor’s Office to be
lawful and well-founded; this finding was
communicated to “C” according to the
statutory procedure.
On 28 December 2006 the criminal case against
“C”, in which he was charged with a
number of serious and very serious crimes, was
referred to the Supreme Court of the Chechen
Republic for examination on the merits.
On 11 May 2005 the Investigation Department of
Gudermes District Department of Internal Affairs
brought criminal case No. 45575 against a number
of unidentified persons for causing bodily
injuries to the accused in Case No. 35014,
“D”, in order to force him to give
testimony.
On 4 September 2006 the criminal case was taken
over by the ChR Prosecutor’s Office.
On 4 October 2006 the investigation into the case
was suspended owing to failure to identify the
person to be prosecuted.
In the course of the investigation it was
established that on the night of 7 November 2004,
“D”, a member of an armed group (gang),
was detained in the Khasavyurt district of the
Republic of Dagestan by officers from the ChR
President’s Security Service and taken to
the Security Service base in Tsentoroy. On 8
November 2004 he was transferred to Gudermes
ROVD. At the time of apprehension, “D”
suffered physical abuse, including a gunshot
injury, at the hands of the Security Service. The
circumstances of the abuse suffered by
“D” were examined at a judicial
hearing. The court found that there was no
objective evidence to support “D”’
allegations that while at the ChR
President’s Security Service base in
Tsentoroy, he was subjected to abuse in order to
obtain testimony from him. All the investigative
activities involving “D” were conducted
in the presence of his defence lawyer.
Furthermore, “D”, exercising his right
under Article 51 of the RF Constitution, refused
to give testimony.
The Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic found
“D” guilty of a number of serious
crimes and sentenced him to 5 years’
imprisonment in a strict-security colony.
On 11 May 2005, under Article 112, paragraph 2,
sub-paragraphs c and d, of the RF Criminal Code,
the Investigation Department of Gudermes District
Department of Internal Affairs in the Chechen
Republic brought criminal case No. 45576 in
connection with the bodily injuries sustained by
“E” while in custody.
On 4 October 2006 the criminal case was taken
over by the ChR Prosecutor’s Office.
On 10 November 2006 the investigation into the
case was suspended owing to failure to identify
the person to be prosecuted.
In the course of the investigation, it was
established that on 14 November 2004,
“E”, a member of an illegal armed unit
who was wanted by the federal authorities, was
apprehended by unidentified law enforcement
officials. He was then taken to the base of the
ChR President’s Security Service and, on 15
November 2004, transferred to Gudermes ROVD. On
arrival at the ROVD, “E” was found to
have bodily injuries in the form of welts on his
head, two welts on his right shoulder, extensive
welts on his right forearm and the wrist of his
right hand, raised marks between the little
finger and the fourth finger on both hands, a
welt on the left part of the waist, a welt on his
ribcage and welts on the surface of the middle
third of the shin.
The circumstances of the abuse suffered by
“E” were examined at a court hearing.
The court found no objective evidence to support
the allegations of “E” that while at
the base of the ChR President’s Security
Service, he was subjected to abuse in order to
obtain testimony from him.
The Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic found
“E” guilty of a number of particularly
serious crimes and sentenced him to 23
years’ imprisonment in a strict-security
colony.
In response to reports of abuse suffered by
“A”, Leninskiy District
Prosecutor’s Office in Grozny carried out an
investigation and on 26 December 2006, decided
not to instigate criminal proceedings.
Following an investigation into reports of abuse
suffered by “B”, it was decided on 2
June 2006 by Leninskiy District Prosecutor’s
Office in Grozny not to instigate criminal
proceedings.
Response from the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs
to paragraph 54 of the CPT report :
On 14 August 2006, “J”, born in …,
arrived at SIZO No. 1 run by the Department of
the FSIN responsible for the Chechen Republic
from the IVS at Groznenskiy ROVD. During the
medical examination carried out on admission to
the IVS, “J” was found to have bodily
injuries in the form of haematomas and bruises,
which were duly entered in the medical records.
“J’s” state of health at the time
when he was placed in the IVS and during his
subsequent detention from 11 to 14 August 2006
was satisfactory. Groznenskiy District
Prosecutor’s Office has instituted criminal
proceedings in connection with the bodily
injuries sustained by “J”.
Response from the RF Ministry of Justice to
paragraph 54 of the CPT repor t:
During the time that he was held at SIZO-1,
“J” filed 3 complaints about unlawful
actions by officers of Groznenskiy ROVD.
“J” did not, however, file any
complaints about conditions of detention with the
SIZO administration or with the agencies
responsible for supervising the activities of
pre-trial establishments.
……………………………..
* Aux termes de l'Article 10, paragraphe 2, de la
Convention établissant le CPT, "Si la
Partie ne coopère pas ou refuse d'améliorer la
situation à la lumière des recommandations du
Comité, celui-ci peut décider, à la majorité
des deux tiers de ses membres, après que la
Partie aura eu la possibilité de s'expliquer, de
faire une déclaration publique à ce
sujet".
* Paragraph 8 reads: The CPT knows already from
previous experience that the Russian authorities
may well seek to identify specific persons
alluded to in its visit reports, especially in
relation to allegations of ill-treatment. This
occurred, for example, after the visit to the
North Caucasian region in November 2004 as
regards the cases set out in paragraph 24 of the
visit report, the Russian authorities claiming in
their response to have established the identity
of the person referred to as case 3. The present
visit report has been drafted in such a way as to
counter that improper approach which, as the CPT
has previously made clear, is incompatible with
the confidentiality which applies by virtue of
the Convention to the Committee's interviews with
detained persons.
[1] Case of M.Aguyev and others (28 August 2006)
[2] This well-established case-law was applied
in, for example, the Mikheyev v. Russia judgment
of 26 January 2006. Reference might also be made
to the CPT's 14th General Report (CPT/Inf (2004)
28).
[3] See the response of the Russian authorities
to the statement made by the CPT’s
delegation at the end of the April/May 2006
visit.
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